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FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4100
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2126
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 5417
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 5432
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8419
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2911
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 6098
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9959
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8483
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3334
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 3971
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 3880
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 3990
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 2641
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 3141
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 3297
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 003499

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ALSO FOR AMBASSADOR BOLTON FROM AMBASSADOR MULFORD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2016
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [UNSC](#) [MOPS](#) [NP](#) [IN](#)
SUBJECT: SARAN ARGUES FOR PRESSURE ON MAOISTS, CRITICIZES
UN APPROACH

REF: A. NEW DELHI 3433

[1](#)B. USUN 1016

Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

[1](#)1. (U) This is an action request for SCA and USUN. Please see para 4.

[1](#)2. (C) Foreign Secretary Saran used a May 19 meeting with the Ambassador (other topics septel) to explain India's concern about the current UN Secretariat approach to Nepal and to appeal for US engagement with the UN to ensure that we are all pulling in the same direction. Saran argued that the main challenge now in Nepal is to maintain pressure on the Maoists, who will enjoy an upper hand over the "squabbling political parties" when negotiations begin. At that stage, he added, the "weak lot" that compose the new government of Nepal "will need all the support it can get." Noting suggestions from New York and UN envoy Tamrat Samuel that the UN might move into a more high profile role, Saran cited Norway and Sri Lanka to argue that mediators inevitably face pressure to appear "even handed," which would grant legitimacy to the Maoists.

[1](#)3. (C) Saran took pains to emphasize that this was not a simple matter of the GOI seeking to keep the UN out of "India's backyard" (addressing the accusation that India just wants to avoid a precedent for Kashmir). Echoing other conversations we have had (ref A), Saran argued that the UN would "have an important role to play, especially when the

election exercise begins to take place." He went on to suggest that the UN was better placed than anyone else to lead the election effort. However, the UN's ability to play an independent role would be compromised if the Secretariat proceeds with plans to brief the Security Council and move to a more activist posture. With this in mind, Saran reported, he told Tamrat Samuel "to avoid the temptation of getting into a mediator's role." Instead, he continued, "the UN along with us should be on the side of the parties, and not a referee." He also complained that the UK Mission in New York seemed to be leading the campaign for a more activist UN presence in Nepal, a point he also made to the UK High Commissioner.

14. (C) Action Request: Based on what he had heard from his mission in New York (ref B) Saran was concerned that the UN Secretariat did not understand India's pragmatic perspective,

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and viewed the GOI as somehow compromised in Nepal. He specifically sought US intervention with the UN Secretariat to urge a more "even handed" approach and to discourage talk of Security Council discussions and mediation missions. Given the high degree of convergence between Saran's outlook and the US perspective on the Maoists, we hope the Department will view Saran's suggestion favorably. End Action Request.
MULFORD